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This thesis is a primer en the subject of computer security.
It is writter for the use of computer systems managers and
addresses basic concepts of computer security and risk
analysis. An example of the techniques employed by a typical
military data processing center is incluied in the form of
the written results of an actual on-site survey. Computer
security is defined in the context of its scope and an
analysis is made of those laws and regulations which direct
the application of security measures into Automatic Data
Processing systems. Finally, a list of some of the major
threats -co computer security and rhe cointermeasures typi-
cally employed to combat those threats is presented.
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During the last fifteen years, the use of computers and
other automatic data processing equipment has increased at
an exponential rate and many computer industry analysts
predict that the proliferation of computer applications will
continue into the next century. To keep pace with the
demand for better and faster systems, the computer industry
has responded with .advances in hardware and software tech-
nology, system design methodology, improved management
philosophies and similar improvements in almost all other
computer-related disciplines. One area that has lagged
behind the technology avalanche is that of computer
security. The annual loss of perhaps millions of dollars
through deliberate and covert penetrations of computer-based
information systems as reported by Allen and as partially
listed in Table I is merely the tip of the iceberg. There
are many companies that withhold acknowledgements of
successful penetrations of their systems and many who are
not aware that their systems have been penetrated. There
are penetrations that compromise classified information and
penetrations that cause personal loss through the violation
of privacy. If one were to put a true monetary value on all
the losses mentioned here, Allan's estinate of millions of
dollars lost would be pale by comparison. The severity of
the computer security problem and the gigantic financial and
personal losses that it involves might lead one to believe
that the computer industry, tha federal government, or the
academic community would have long ago discovered a remedy.
While it would not be realistic to expect a method for
10
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guaranteeing a one-hundred percent secure system, it is
reasonable to expect that a computer based information
system could be constructed that would at least prevent most
of the penetrations. The truth is that the technology and
the procedures are available and they would be effective if
computer systems managers would only use them. The reasons
for not using computer security measures will be covered
later. Suffice it to say at this point that managers are
finally waking up tc the fact that computer security is
something to be concerned about.
The current and increasing concern for data security is
the result of three major interrelated factors.
The firs* is the dramatic technological advancement in
automatic data processing equipment and software systems
mentioned briefly above. In a modern computer environment,
multiple jobs and/or multiple users can concurrently access
the facilities and the stored data of the system.
Computation speeds are fast approaching billions of opera-
tions per second, and the amount cf stored data ranges well
into the billions of bytes. Each of a variety of users has a
variable security authorization and the data sets themselves
have diverse security requirements.
The second factor is the increasing need of science,
industry and government for processing vast quantities of
data as quickly as possible. Further, decreasing per-unit
processing and storage costs have increased the number of
applications economically feasible to automate.
The third factor, the result of greater availability of
communications facilities and terminal devices, is the
increasing emphasis en providing computer access at remote
operations levels. Much effort in recent years has been
devoted to simplifying the interface between the user and
the computer. As a result, many systems provide guidance
and computer- assisted instructions to h=lp the user become
increasingly productive and increasingly knowledgeable.
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These developments have led to systems that permit the
users to do their jobs faster and better. As the access to
information is extended, however, so must the security
measures that control this access. The computer systems
manager faces increas singly difficult decisions as a result
of this information extension. The decisions stem from the
need to balance the risk of the loss threatened with the
cost of countermeasusres. Risk management, as this
balancing process is called, is an imprecise science and is
a relatively new field of study for ths computer profes-
sional. As such, the subjective assessments and judgements
of the manager must te inordinately relied upon throughout
the process. The scope of the security problem approaches
infinity and the term "secure" must be considered, at best,
a temporary state of any system. The budget constraints of
many organizations, both public and private, tend to limit
the programs and projects that managers can pursue. If
those organizations have never experienced security prob-
lems, the opposition by upper level management to the
application of security measures can be anticipated. One
final aspect cf compu-er security can complicate the manag-
er* s task. 2ven if the conscious decision by all levels of
management is made to install secuity safeguards, the task
of retro- fitting an unsecure system is not easy. The
process of "designing in" security is much more preferable
and the historical efforts to "bolt on" security have been
expensive and largely unsuccessful due to a lack of sophist-
icated analysis.
The computer systems manaaer , and more explicitly, the
security manager must possess a myriad of skills and abili-
ties, foremost of which is z he ability to produce cost
effective techniques for maintaining or raising the security
level of his system without significantly increasing the
complexity of the user interface. He must also be capable of
13

constant vigilence for as soon as he relaxes, the advantage
gees to the potential penetrator.
Good security is not a conglomeration of individual
countermeasures fending off specific secuity threats. it is
a well designed system of countermeasures that act in unison
to protect the whole system. Risk management is the process
by which this design is constructed and implemented.
B. OBJECTIVES
Many formal education programs are glared explicitly to
the prospective computer systems manager. While these
programs provide the would-be manager with the general
skills required of the occupation, most of them only briefly
address computer security and then only as an ancillary
topic. The objective of this thesis is to supplement formal
computer systems education by providing the junior computer
systems manager with a non-technical, conversational know-
ledge of computer security. Toward this and, a moderately
concise definition of the subject is presented along with an
assessment of the subject scopa. Additionally, a brief over-
view ani analysis of the laws and regulations pertaining to
computer security is presented . This is followed by a
discussion of risk management and some of the techniques it
employs. An enumeration of the chief -threats to computer
security and the countermeasures typically employed to
combat those threats follows ani finally, the results of a
computer security survey of an actual military da~a proces-
sing center is offered as an exarcise in security assessment




II* COMPUTER SEC5RITY DEFINED
Most literature dealing with the subject of computer
security attempts, at some point, to define the term. A
fault with many of these definitions is that they are
presented in abstract, and therefore, not very useful terms.
Others, although adequately defining coiputsr security in
useful terms, fail to describe its scope. Since the scope of
the term is surprisingly broad, a good working definition
should include at least an overview of the topic. One of the
few useful definitions of computer security encountered in
the literature survey for this thesis cones from Pritchard
[Ref. 2: p, 7]. In his book, Pritchard describes general
classifications of losses due to breaches in computer
security. These classifications are:
A. Loss cf system availability
B. Loss cf system integity
C. Loss of systei confidentiality
In order to fully appreciate a computer security defini-
tion, it is useful to be acquainted with the scope of the
subject. Although the subject of risk analysis will be
treated in later chapters, in order to adequately describe
the scope of computer security, it is useful to present a
overview analysis of threat classifications at this point in
order to give the reader some indication of the size of the
problem. Usina Prichard's loss classifications, general
threat categories are listed below:
15

A. LOSS OF SYSTEM AVAILABILITY
There are many ways that system availability can be
affected. Depending on the size and the distributed nature
cf any particular system, the general assets of that system
include seven basic categories. The general vulnerabilities




The hardware of any system is the foundation upon
which all other components of a computerized information
system rest. When hardware assets are lost, system perfor-
mance decreases - sometimes to zero. Some general






2 So ft ware
Software is the collection of instructions that
directs the hardware through its required operations. As
software assets are lost, seme measure of performance is
also lost. Some general software vulnerabilities related to
system availability are:
• susceptibility tc modification
• wide accessibility




3- Data and Docu irentation
These two computer system assets are grouped
together because they are closely related in that they are
both vulnerable to similar threats. Data is the resource
upon which the hardware/software combination operates.
Documentation is the set of operating instructions. Loss or
degradation cf either or both of these assets renders a
system useless or counterproductive. Sons general documen-




The communications aspects Df a given system can be
as complicated as a multi-noded distributed system linked by
microwave and satellite relay or as simple as a guar'-.er inch
cable leading to off-line storage in tha aext room. Partial
or complete loss of communications between system nodes or
components can result in a spectrum of problems ranging from
complete system collapse, to the failure of a particular
applications package. Some vulnerabilities of communications
assets are:
• subceptability to interception
• subceptability to jamming or blocking
• har dware/softwar e dependent
5« Environment
Although the reliability of computer hardware has
increased in recent years, the technological precision of
many hardware components has also increased thereby making
environmental assets such as air conditioning, humidity
control, and power sources essential to system availability.
Environmental degradation can cause system collapse or
17








Support is the word that describes all those activi-
ties not part of the information processing system itself,
but without which the system could not function. Examples of
support activities range from the steaiy, uninterrupted
delivery of continuous form paper to the steady, uninter-
rupted delivery of electrical power. Interruption of
support can disrupt an information system by varying degrees
and the effects of such a disruption depends upon the effec-
tiveness of contingency planning.
B. LOSS 0? SYSTEM INTEGRITY
The most common application of the term "system
integrity" is to the data on which a system operates. A
useful definition of data integrity is
the state existing when data 2. aree s with the source from
which it is derived, and when it has net been either
accidentally or maliciously altered, disclosed, or
destroyed fEef. 3: p. 7].
This aspect cf computer security is perhaps the most diffi-
cult to guard against because it is usually the most
difficult to detect. An inadvertant or malicious degradation
in data integity can have varying results ranging froan the
taking of action based on incorrect information to the crash
of the entire system. In most cases, the discovery of the
lack of data integrity is aftsr the fact. Seme generic
types of data integrity vulnerabilities are:
18

accidental or malicious entry errors
accidental or malicious processing alterations
C. LOSS OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Loss of confidentiality probably describes the thought
that comes immediately to mind whenever the topic of
computer security is mentioned. It is potentially the most
serious result of an insecure system. Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) #41 defines confidentiality as
a concept which applies to data. It is the status
accorded to data which requires protection from unau-
thorized disclosure.
This definition, although useful, is perhaps a bit narrow.
Substituting the word "information" for the word "data" in
the definition broadens the definition appreciably and
points to an important theoretical concept. Information is
the result of data processing or manipulation. Data itself
is analogous to the words in a dictionary. Each word
contains a value or meaning but when combined with other
words in a process called language, tha sum cf the words
conveys a concept or idea. Data is merely the conglomeration
of unasscciated fields (words). The problem of data security
therefore, transends the collection of data fields and
extends to the process through which those fields are
processed into information. In this thesis, the treatment of
the security problem is restricted to data and its proces-
sing, but the reader should be aware that information
security is a much larger concept that only begins at the
point of processing. The losses suffered from a lack of
confidentiality are usually evaluated first in a typical
risk management scenario because those safeguards put in
19

place to protect system con fidentiality many times solve
problems in the other loss catagories. Some general threats
to confidentiality are:
• accidental or intentional interception
• unauthorized access
D. DEFINITION
The above discussion of loss categories and their
subsets is presented to impress the reader with the scope of
the computer secuity problem. With the immense proportions
of that problem in mind, the following definition of
computer secuity is offered:
Computer security is the p rotectian of computing
assets or resources and computer based systems
against accidental a nd de liberate threats whose
occurrance may cause losses due to those systems
'
non-availab ility, la ck of integrity t or lack of
con fi dentia lity.
[Ref. 2: P- 7]
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF SECURITY LAWS AND REGULATIONS
The need for computer security was not of primary
concern to computer systems managers during the accelerated
growth of the computer industry in the 1970's. Managers of
information systems were much too busy dealing with great
technological leaps in the hardware and software offerings
of major vendors. The efforts to maintain security were
largely ineffective because of the lack of management
support and because of the predominantly after-the-fact
design of security safeguards - the "bolt on" security
systems mentioned earlier. Due to articles such as that of
Allen [Ref. 1: pp. 52-62] and tfoffett [Ref. 4: pp. 124-126]
and ether preceding authors, the public soon became aware of
the potential and actual misuse of data and information
systems. Articles concerning the raisai ventures of unsu-
specting cit zens and their battles with credit agencies,
banks, and billing and collecting firms ware not uncommon in
the media. Finally, due to public pressure on legislators
for protection against the invasion of privacy and for a
legal method of correcting incorrect or incomplete personal
data, two major laws were ratified by the Congress. This
legislation had the ultimate effect of making computer
systems managers more aware of the need for data privacy and
data integrity. The history behind other laws, regulations,
and directives is not quite as colorful, but the fact that
they exist in large quantities is, no doubt, a commentary on
the vulnerability of computer files and data to mistreat-
ment, broad access, and disclosure. The following sections
of this chapter contain a brief analysis of the regulations
and laws that affect the computer systems managers of the
federal government. The disoussion is arranged in two
21

categories. The first category deals with regulations
affecting organizations within the federal government; the
second category is a generalized treatment of agency-
specific directives.
A. THE PRIVACY ACT AND OTHER LEGISLATION
1- IkS Privacy Act of 19 7<£
The Privacy Act of 197 4 imposes numerous require-
ments upon federal agencies to prevent the misuse or
compromise of data containing personal information. Federal
automatic data processing (ADP) organizations which process
personal data must provide a reasonable degree of protection
against unauthorized disclosure, destruction, or modifica-
tion of personal data, whether intentionally caused or
resulting from accident or carelessness. These requirements
demand the applicatior of managerial, administrative, and
technical procedures. FIPS #M addresses the requirements
and the corresponding safeguards used' tc implement the
provisions of the Act. Table II lists those items.
Two desirable by-products of the Privacy Act are the
promotion of risk analysis and the elimination of unneces-
sary data, a procedure undertaken to narrow the range of the
safeguards used. Both of these side effscts aided in the
development of more secure systems; the risk management
promotion in refining the techniques of a little used proce-
dure, and the purging of files in creating more concise,
manageable data bases.
2. The Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act requires federal
agencies to publish in the Fedsral Hegistar, certain infor-
mation related to personal files. This information must




























[ Ref . 3: p. 8]
retained by those agencies can be obtained. Additionally,
the Act reguires that a general discription of the data, the
processes that act upon the data, and the results of those
processes be available through the channels described in the
Federal Register. The Act appears to be loosely worded and
has many exceptions thereby diluting soma of its effective-
ness. Once again, however, the awareness level of federal
agency information system managsrs to computer security was
raised. The Act compels the manager to establish, at least,
a defensible security policy and a set of corresponding
procedures for the protection of data.
23

3« Office of Management and Budget Q ME) Circular A2IO8
OMB Circular A-108 is the implementation of the
Privacy Act of 1974. It, along with ths guidelies of FIPS
#41, put teeth into the Privacy Act by explaining, point by
point and in specific terms, the administrative procedures
to be followed and the policies to be established by all
federal agencies. Although computer files are not addressed
in A-198, and therefore 10 technical procedures for
protecting computer files, the underlying effect of the
circular is to reinforce top management' s support of data
security
.
4. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 5 of Title 15
This regulation deals with the standardization of
data elements and representations. Although only peripher-
ally associated with security, it is included here for two
reasons. First, it illustrates the initial efforts of the
federal government to establish a huge distributed system of
data bases that could extend the capability of agency-to-
agency data exchange. Secondly, while the concept of of
standardization is a sound managerial technique for
promoting efficiency, it simplifies the potential penetra-
tor's task by not only aiding the standardization of his
efforts, but also, increasing the number of potential entry
points where he might access the information.
B. AGENCY SPECIFIC REGULATIONS 1ND DIRECTIVES
Most of the material in this category belongs to one of
two sub- categories
.
The first subset includes agency procedures for handling
classified information. Usually, only briaf mention of clas-
sified computer files is made in this type directive. Seme




The range of specific security aspects covered in these
directives is generally good, but directions as to the tech-
nical implementation of policiss within a specific facility
is not. The absence of technical procedures facilitates the
diversity of hardware and software throughout the agency.
It also allows subjective judgements to be made at the
installation level as to threat assessment and appropriate
safeguards. The potential exists, at the installation level,
for the subjective judgements of management personnel to be
influenced by the operational workload, the manning level,
and the technology level of the installation hardware and
software. That being the case, the strengths of individual
programs may vary significantly. Examples of such directives
are contained in DODD 5200-28, OPNAV 5239. 1 (Navy) , and MCO
P55 10.1U (Marine Corps).
The second category of agency specific directives 'are
locally developed security plans applicable only to the
individual activity. These documents should be, and for the
most part are, the embodiment of all nigher directives and
tailored to the local environment. Again, considerable flex-
ibility is allowed. Security plans offer a wide variance in
coverage. What is more, the enforcement of local security





Computer security is initially concerned with deter-
mining and implementing cost-effective counter measures to
make a system secure against the many threats which can
occur. It is concerned, therefore, with reducing the
frequency with which any threat is expected to occur and/or
reducing the impact of the threats upon the correct func-
tioning of the system. Secondly, it is concerned with what
has to be done when the normal mode of operation is
disrupted. It is concerned with contingency planning, that
is, the preparation and execution cf a standby mode of oper-
ation and with the preparation and execution of recovery
plans. The third concern of computer security is the
auditing of the system in both the normal and standby modes
of operation [Ref. 2: p. 2].
Risk management is the name given to the process by
which all three of the above concerns are dealt with and its
objective is to protect the system from losses resulting
from these concerns. Its organization is variable, that is,
task organized to the specific need, but the major methodol-
ogies employed are basic. They are
threat identification
threat impact measurement
count ermeasure identification and measurement
countermeasure selection
implementation and monitoring of safeguard effect
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There are several g cod references on the topic of risk
management (see bibliography) and since this thesis deals
with the subject as a subset of computer security, only a
cursory look will be taken at some of the procedures it
employs.
Risk management is essentially concerned with developing
and maintaining a cost-effective security program. The
optimal point at which the employing organization should
operate is as illustrated in Figure 4.1 The downward sloping
curve (curve A) illustrates the effect on losses as counter-
measures are applied. The upward sloping curve (curve B) is
the cost of the countermeasures as they are successively
applied. The U-shaped curve (curve C) above the intersecting
lines is the total of both the cost of losses and the cost
of countermeasures. The optimum operating position is, quite
obviously, the lowest point (point 0) on the rJ-shaped, or
total cost, curve. The distance between the X-axis and the
low point on the total cost curve is the total number of
dollars spent on countermeasures plus the total number of
dollars lest due to security breaches when operating at the
the optimal level. The total number of iollars is read on
the y-axis at the point (point ?) horizontal to and left of
the low point. The level of protection is represented by the
length of line (E) and read on the x-axis at point (Q) . The
total number of dollars expended in either of the two ways
is affected, of course, by the effectiveness of the counter-
measures emploved. One of the most effective countermeasures
is the reduction of the number of personnel authorized
access and the reduction of the number of access points.
Successive reductions in either the authorized personnel or
the access points certainly will solve the security problem,
but it also reduces the availability of information to the
organization which, in turn, decreases the organization's
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Figure U. 1 The Optimal Lsvel of Conputer Security.
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middle ground must be found and that is point (0) in the
figure. The underlying point to all this is that it is the
risk manager's job tc reduce the threat of security in the
most cost effective way while maintaining the level of
information availability. Some other interesting points are
illustrated in Figure 4. 1 . Note that the total cost curve
(C) appears to approach the vertical asymtotically on the
right. The futher projection of this line might reveal that
it, in fact, doubles back to the left at some point. This
graphically represents the fact that at some point, far to
the right of the optimal operating point, the successive
application of countermeasure upon countermeasure will
become counterproductive. Note also that ^he curve repre-
senting countermeasure expenditures (B) never quite reaches
the one hundred per cent protection vertical from the
x-axis. Another point to note is that there remains a
vertical distance between the x-axis and the loss curve.
This says that the losses are never cut to zero.
Although risk management involves the countering of
secuity threats in three aspects, only cost-effectiveness
determination will be discussed ir. this chapter. The aspects
of contingency planning and auditing will be treated in
Chapter six.
B. COST EFFECTIVENESS DETERMINATION
As discussed before, the third part zi risk analysis is
the analysis and application of cost effective countermea-
sures. This process has essentially three distinct steps
(threat assessment, countermeasure assessment, countermea-






Threat assessment is composed of three components.
The first component is the identification of the threats
applicable to the system in question. The list of threats
will certainly be different for each individual system but
they are all determined in a, more or less, subjective
manner. Decomposing threats into threat categories is the
first step. A manager may wish to use a decomposition
similar to that of Figure 4. 2 or he may use a checklist such
as was used tc determine the threat categories in Chapter 7.
In either case, the final decomposition of the threat is
usually done by the checklist method. Marine Corps Order
P5510.14 and OPNAVINST 5239.1 contain examples of
checklists.
The second component of threat assessment is the
determination of threat occurrence frequency. This informa-
tion can be obtained through the use of the organization's
historical data or can be derived from the study of other
similar organizations. Much effort should be expanded to
determine frequency as accurately as possible for it will
figure significantly into the oost computations of counter-
measures as will be demonstrated later in the process.
The next, and final, step in threat assessment is
the determination of total exposure. This procedure is no
more than the multiplication of the factors determined in
the first two components using the following formula:
T = N1 X C1 N2 X C2 Nn X Cn
where T is the total loss (usually expressed in terms of
dollars) per year. It is the expected annual loss from all
threats combined. Nn is the total number of occurrences of a
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single threat expected annually and Cn is the amount of less
per occurrence. The product of each threat and it's
frequency is added to the product of all other threats and
frequencies thereby yielding T.
2. Countermeasure Assessment
The second component of cost effectiveness determi-
nation is the assessment of coun termeasures. At this point,
a slight digression is in order. Countermeasure accessment
involves the evaluation of the effectiveness of various
counterieasures and as such can become very complicated as
the number of the countermeasur es under analysis increases.
The task of the manager can be simplified somewhat by clas-
sifying countermeasures by the method used to handle
threats. Four general methods for handling threats are
commonly used. The first is threat avoidance. Threat avoi-
dance involves isolating the com ponent (s) vulnerable to the
threat and eliminating these com ponent (s) . Since most system
components are vulnerable to some sort of threat, if this
method were used exclusively, it would be only a matter of
time until there was no system. The second method of threat
handling is threat retention. Threat retention is usually
employed when T = Nn X Cn is small for a particular threat.
A threat in this category is either ignored or handled in
con-junction with the third threat handling procedure
threat transfer. Threat transfer is nothing more than the
utilization of some sort cf insurance to offset the effects
of the threat. Threat reduction, the fourth threat handling
procedure, is, by far, the most common. It is the applica-
tion of positve steps or devices designed to reduce the
number of threat occurrences and the effects cf each threat.
Some examples are physical access control, processing
restrictions, and tempest shielding.
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The next step in countermeasure assessment is the
determination of effectiveness. For example, if countermea-
sure XYZ reduces the frequency (N| of a threat from ten
incidents to one incident per year; and the loss per inci-
dent from $1,000 tc $850, the effectiveness of the
countermeasure can be given a numerical quantification as
follows:
Nn« X Cn« = T»
(Total loss per cccuran:e with countermeasure)
then
T* $850 utilizing countermeasure XYZ
T = $10,000 without countermeasure XYZ
therefore
(T - T") / T = effectiveness
substituting
($10,000 - $850) / 310,000 = 0.915
This says that countermeasure X?Z is 91.5* effective.
3- Q°uili££I!l§§.§ur.r: Selection
One method of countermeasure selection is presented
below by the continuation of the example above.
Suppose countermeasure XYZ costs $5,000 to implement
and has a failure rate of 8.5 ro (1003 - 91.5%). The total
cost of usina the measure is computed as follows:



































1c - total cost
T = Nn X Cn (as computed above)






Tc = $10,000 $5,000 - 310,000(1 - .385)
= $10,000 + $5,000 - $9, 1 50
= $5,850
This final figure is the total loss to the using organiza-
tion. Total losses of $10,000 were sustained prior to
countermeasure XYZ employment. After ^ountermeasare XYZ
employment, total losses where $5,850 ($5,000 of which were
implementation expenses). The countermeasure, then saves
$4,150 ($10,000 - $5,850) the first year, and 39,150
($10,000 - 850) in each succeeding year.
The simple example above was derived from the proce-
dures shewn in FTPS #31 [ Ref . 5: pp. 12-13]. Note that the
procedure involves the use of only one countermeasure. Not
only are several measures compared, in most, cases, but
discounting techniques are also used. This is but one
method of determining cos* effective count ermeasures. Other
3U






The scope of computer security, as discussed in chapter
2, approaches infinity. The topic's large size is a direct
result of the large number of potential threats to the
computer system. Since any discussion of computer security
threats must be finite, that discussion must, therefore, be
incomplete. With that in mind, this chapter will seek: to
present both general and specific threats to computer
security along with seme of their effects.
Pritchard [ Ref . 2: p. 19] and Csrullo and Shelton
[Ref. 6: p. 52] describe various methods for decomposing
threats into classifications. One such classification is
illustrated in Figure 5.1 reprinted her? for convenience.
Note that this example could be modified by the addition cf
"Hardware", "Software", and "Personal" under "Deliberate -
Social". Checklists are another way of identifying threats.
Checklists usually reflect the needs of their composers and
a specific computer system and, therefor?, are not usually
complete. A checklist composed of several checklists from
different sources may prove to be fairly comprehensive. This
is essentially the technique used in the construction of the
following list. Four main references [Ref. 5: pp. 77-82],
[Ref. 7: pp. 3.3-9. 15] # [Ref. 3], and [Ref. 9: pp. G1-G50]
were used. For the purposes of this thesis, threats are





































Physical threats come in a variety of forms that can be
decomposed into two main areas - controllable and uncontrol-
lable. Examples are:
CONTROLLABLE
• physical attack (civil disobedience, military as-
sault, arson, looting, sabotage, vandalism)
• fire
• smoke, dust, and dirt intrusion
• bursting water pipes
• electromagnetic disturbance (lightening, vacuum
cleaners, floor polishers)
• forcible entry and theft
UNCONTROLLABLE





Controllable threats are those threats that can be
prevented from occurir.g to a greater degree by the applica-
tion of sufficient safeguards. Uncontrollable threats are
those that cannot be prevented but whose effect can be
minimized by proper procedures. The line between the two
classifications is net well-defined as is evident by the
presence of the same threat (lighting) ander both catego-
ries. The line becomes clearer when specific computer
installations are addressed along with the resources and the
location of that installation. Note that the threat ioes not
have to affect the computer facility directly. Just as an





The technical sophistication of communications facili-
ties and devices is a growing trend in today's world. Man is
able to communicate using satellite relay, laser technology,
fiber optic mechanisms, and microwave transmissions. When
these technologies are used in conjunction with computer
systems, large amounts of data can be transferred over long
distances at staggering rates. Conventional means of data
transfer are also used. Telephone lines and direct line
coaxial cable can be used in many cases. There are only
three main types of threats that effect communications
security but the i nple mentation of these three differ
significantly from one communications medium to the next
thereby allowing for a great many permutations and combina-
tions of threats. The main threats are:
• eavesdropping
• interception
• denial or destruction
Eavesdropping involves siphoning off information from a
communication without detection. Interception is the inter-
ruption of a communication from its flow towards its
intended destination and the redirection of that flow to an
unintended destination. Denial/destruction is exactly what
it says; the interuption of communications by such methods
as jamming and destruction of :o mmunication equipment.
There is one other threat that can be logically listed
here or under several other categories. This threat involves
the browsing, interrogation, destruction, or alteration of
information contained in a computer file through the use of
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external communication. This method works in reverse of the
threats listed above. A recent example involved a ring of
teenagers who owned personal computers and who were able to
break in to the data banks of several large commercial
institutions.
C. EMANATIOHS
Emanations are the by-product of computing devices as
they communicate with their peripherals (especially cathode
ray tubes). The product of this communication is electromag-
netic energy containing the the essence of the
communication. This electromagnetic energy can be read by
complicated but common devices. The range of most of these
devices is restricted to a few hundred yards, at best, but
the technique is very successful in the absence of specifi-
cally designed safeguards. Since this threat is relatively
expensive for the penetrator to employ, the probability of
this threat occurring is usually proportional to the sensi-
tivity or classification of the information on file at the
specific activity. The probability of an emanation threat to
a local grocery store's inventory file, for example, is
extremely remote.
D. HARDWARE
Hardware threats are those threats that normally affect
the integrity of the computer or its storad data. The chief
hardware threat involves the physical manner in which data
is manipulated within the machine. The instruction set of a
given machine is the set of commands that the machine is
designed to understand. These instructions manipulate the
machine's inner workings at various levels. If there is no
provision as to the access ibility of these instructions
among the various operations layers, an inadvertent or
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malicious penetration of all levels may occur. The potential
effects are:
• the destruction/alteration of 3ata
• the alteration of the operating system
• the absence of predictable manipulations
The unreliability of a computer manipulation is the
chief threat to computer security. Tha changing of an
instruction set or the absence of design features that
ensure reliability is the threat's physical manifestation.
Hardware security is more appropriately addressed in the
next chapter (Counter measures) because it addresses some of
the ways reliability is aided.
E. SOFTWARE
Software threats come in two categories - lack of reli-
ability and subversion. The reliability threat is as
applicable to software as it is to hardware but the differ-
ence is that one is a physical concept and the other is a
procedural concept. The software threat is more complicated
than that of hardware because software is arranged in many
layers (operating system, utilities, applications) whereas
hardware is only one layer. This layering of software not
only increases the ar=a cf vulnerability, it complicates the
protection requirements.
Software subversion is another type of software threat
that is much akin to software reliability but differs in
that it is a deliberate rather than accidental threat. There
are two main types cf software subversion. One type is
called a TROJAN HORSE. A trojan horse is a bit of code that
is inserted into one of the levels of the software and is
designed to provide an entry port for a penetrator. It can
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be summoned only through a pre-defined code that is designed
so that the Dortal is not vulnerable to accidental
discovery. It is an active threat , that is, it requires the
penetrator to actively engage it. Another type of subversion
is called the TRAP DOOR. A trap door is code that is
inserted much like a trojan horse. The difference between
the two is that a trap door reg;uires no assistance from the
penetrator other than its initial insertion. The program
runs automatically when a target set of parameters is met.
An example is the insertion of a trap door into an aplica-
tions package that processes classified data. The trap door
activates itself through the use of the package and perhaps
routes a second copy of a resulting classified report to a
printer in another location. The penetrator could either
pick up the report himself at the other Location or he may
allow the repcrt to be deliverai to him via the inter-office
delivery system.
Software threats, although categorized into two general
components, take on many disguises and are capable of
causing losses in an infinite number cf ways. The following
chapter will deal with software threat sountermeasures and
may illuminate the topic appreciably.
F. PERSONNEL
Personnel threats in ths computer environment are
perhaps the bottom line in a study of computer security. All
three categories of loss (availability, integrity, and
confidentiality) are affectid by the inadvertent or
purposeful actions of humans. The form of the human threat
can range from the simple absence of a key person at a
computer facility to the covert activities of an undercover
penetrator. The predominant personnel threat, of course, is
the proclivity of the human to lake errors.
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A study conducted by Simonetti, Sass, and Monoky of the
University of Toledo, [ Ref . 10: p. 204] was designed to
determine what changes had been made in computer security
systems during the ten years prior to the study. The
correlation between the number of changes made and the
TABLE III
Changes Hade in Security Systems
ORGANIZATION CHANGES MADE PERCENT 3F ORGANIZATIONS
SURVEYED MAKING CHANGES
In human error control





In warning systems for
attempted false entry







aspect af computer security that required changing due to
inadequacy of previous safeguards was assumed to be high.
The results of that study is presented in Table III above.
The inference is that human interaction with the
computer and its information is the threat most recognized
by security system managers. The study cites another inter-
esting statistic. Of all computer frauds committed and




Procedural threats are those that relate to the manage-
ment function of control and affect the workflow process.
Procedural threats are those -hat act upon those workflow
points were control is passed from one function, element, or
individual to another. Procedural threats can be accidental
or malicious in nature and can be more accurately described
in terms of safeguards designed to to counteract them.
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71. COUNTERS EASO RES
Although the threats to the security of a computer
system are numerous, there also exists an abundance of
devices and procedures by which each can be countered. In
order to intelligently employ an effective risk management
program, the the manager must be aware of the countermeasure
options he has available to him. The following paragraphs
contain some of the considerations that must be made whan
choosing appropriate protection. Provided also is a listing
of various methods used to combat specific threats.
A. PHYSICAL SECURITY
Physical countermeasures are employe! to minimize the
effects of dangers to the tangible assets of a computer
system. Most of these methods use comnon sense and are
directed at one specific aspect of physical security. The
external and internal environment of a computer center are
most important to physical security and iepend upon some of
the follcwina considerations:
physical location
availability of fire and law enforcement services
availability of medical facilities
construction materials
physical access routes
to present a list of specific counter-
measures without knowing the particular needs and operating
constraints of a given system, however, it is possible to
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establish standards that guide the manager of computer
assets. The following list of standards apply more or less
to all facilities.
1. The structural soundness of buildings housing
computer equipment should be adequate to: support the
weight of computing machinery; accomodate electrical
cabling and fire extinguishing systems; minimize the
effects of wind, precipitation, and lightening; with-
stand, in some cases, the effects of explosions.
2. The employment of physical acoess controls to
computer equipment, tape files, master documentation,
master software copies, and environmental support
(air conditioning, humidity control equipment, elec-
trical power sources) should be established. (These
steps are applicable to remote terminal locations as
well.)
Some of the more common implementations of the above
standards are:
• The number of windows and doors or other physical entry
paths should be minimized consistent: with local fire regula-
tions.
• Chain link fences should be used where the classifica-
tion of the information within dictates.
• The use of cipher locks, second access doers, holding
areas, guards, and closed circuit TV can be employed where
feasible.
• Exterior lighting should be employed where appropriate.
• Pcsitve key control should always be maintained.
US

• Identification badges or other such devices are
somtimes useful.
• automatic fire warning, detection, and extinguishing
systems with optional extinguisher delay to protect against
inadvertant activation may be employed. Supplemental devices
such as smoke removal systems, air filtration systems, and
plastic sheeting used to cover equipment in the svent of
fire extinguisher activation are also useful.
• Uninteruptable power supplies, pow = r surge insulators
and appropriate power source switching devices can be
installed.
• Air conditioning and humidity coatrol devices are
normally a necessity in large installations.
• Anti-sta + ic carpeting and controlled use of electromag-
netic motors (floor buffers, vacuum cleaners) protect
against, the destruction of tape and disk files.
• Depending on the severity of the threat, those mechan-
isms considered critical to operations (air conditioning,
humidity controls, fire detection and extinguishing systems)
can be installed redundantly.
• The training of personnel is an inportant aspect of
physical security. Fire drills, bomb threat drills, security





Personnel security is, perhaps, the most difficult
aspect of an effective counter measure program to maintain
because it requires the greatest amount of subjective
judgement from the manager. While no personnel program is
one hundred percent effective, there are several basic steps




The complexity of a screening program depends, in
large part, upon the composition of the population from
which the selection is tc made and upon the potential losses
that could result from incorrect selection. Whenever
possible, a thorough screening of medical, employment
history, scholastic, and psychiatric records should be
accomplished and disqualifying criteria established.
Personnel interviews and testing are also valuable tools
during this phase of a surety program. In exceptional cases,
a complete background investigations can be obtained.
2« Selection Cr iteria and Selection
Establishing selection criteria is probably the most
subjective part of a personnel security program. If feas-
ible, aide can be sought from professionals (psychiatrists,
physicians, etc.) but the manager ultimately must make the
final decision as to what criteria are to be used.
3- Maintenance
The selection of individuals for various positions
begins the maintenance portion of the program. Maintenance
programs include activi-ies such as periodic training,
briefing, and performance evaluations. Evaluation techniques
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abound but the most frequently used is iay-to-day observa-
tion of an individuals habits, attitudes, physical appear-
ance, and, if possible, after hours activities.
* • Debriefing
Debriefing is an aide that helps preserve a giver-
security posture. The classical debriefing includes
relieving the individual of classified and sensitive duties
and material for a period prior to his departure and
obtaining sworn statements froa the individual. Debriefing
in itself would not seem to be very effective, but as a part
of a comprehensive program, it may be very useful.
The unpredictability of human behavior is perhaps
the most complicated variable in any security program but a
conscientiously pursued personnel program that includes the
steps cited above can reduce personnel security risk appre-
ciably and may localize the effects of personnel threats, A
good personnel program is not the answer to total security.
Systems that have many remote users often cannot apply
personnel surety program techniques to tie vast majority of
their customers. In that sort of situation, other counter-
measure types must be used.
C. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
Communications security, or the lack thereof, has influ-
enced ~he outcomes of wars, the success of private
companies, and the length of a head of state's term of
office. Today, the technologies that enable man to convey
information, especially digital information, complicate the




Encryption is the most widespraad method of countering
communication threats. The technique uses some variable key
to seed an encrypting algorithm. The algorithm scrambles the
transmitted information into un intelligible code which can
be unscrambled by a reversing algorithm at the information's
destination. The same key must be used to seed the
unscrambling algorithm. The keys can be changed periodically
or they may change with each transmission. Historically, the
usefulness of an encoding algorithm and its associated keys
has been an inverse function of the time it remains in use.
One technique that deserves mention as an aide ro commu-
nication security is not really an established security
method at all, but rather, a side effect of a message
routing schema. The method is called packet switching and it
is used to solve complex message relay problems in medium to
large networks. The stream of information is essentially
chopped into variable length chunks called packers. Figure
6.1 illustrates the information that is affixed to the
packet. The leading and trailing edge of each receive a
coded sequence that essentially keeps each packet from
combininq with other packets. As the nessaqe leaves its
source, a software generated header is inserted after the
leadinq edqe indicator. The header contains information
such as the source of the message, the destination, the
message number, the packet number, and other pertinent
information. Each packet, with all its added information,
is then routed to its destination via varying routes. As
Figure 5.2 shews, ail packets 1 o not have to 'rake the same
path to the destination and may, in fast, arrive at the
destination out of sequence. A hardware device at the desti-
nation then strips the added information from each packet
and assembles the messaqe in the proper order. The security
aspect of packet switchinq lies in the faot that the various
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Figure 6.1 Typical Packet Cons-cuction.
intended destination. A penetrator that has tapped one
segment of the network may or may not receive the entire
message and may receive the packers out of sequence- Packet
switching is not a reliable security method because the
movement of the packets in the network is random and as such
does not negate the possibility tha*^ - entire message may
move over the same path.
Eavesdropping is the primary threat to communication
security, but there are two other threats that account for a
small percentage of the total communication threat. The
denial of ccmmunicaticn by jamming the communicating signal
or by simply cutting the connecting cables is one Df these
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Figure 6.2 Representative Packet Switching Network.
through the use cf back-up of transmission media. The other
low-percentage threat is the re- routing of communications io
unintended destinations. This is orinariiy a software
problem and will dealt with latar in this chapter.
D. EMANATIONS SECURITY
There are three basic counts rmea sures that can be used,
individually cr in parallel, to minimize information
compromise through emanations interception.
1. The first method is simply the establishment of a
physical buffer area around the computer installa-
tion. The radius of such an area depends on the
strength of the emanations and the probable
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sensitivity of an emanations receiving device, but a
common figure used is 300 yards. The strength of the
emanations signal is dependant upon the maintenance
status of the equipment and the method of
installation.
2. The second method is the reduction of the emanating
signal through the use of appropriate sheiiding. In
many instances, computer complexes are lined with
sheet metal.
3. The third method is the adjusting of the equipment to
limit emanatior strength.
E. HARDWARE SECURITY
Hardware countermeasures are designed to combat threats
to data integrity. The physical implementations of hardware
security devices take several forms but all are constructed
to assure reliability in the internal procedures of the
machine. The following hardware security features are
common
:
1. Most central processing units (CPU) utilize an
instruction set that is split into privileged and
non-privileged portions. Privileged instructions are
those that are used by the operating system to
perform its supervisory tasks and are not accessible
to the user. Any attempt to invoke a privileged
instruction from other than the operating system
causes an exception condition and all processing of
the job ceases. Unfortunately, many trapdoors use the
interupt feature of the system as their activation
signal. This type threat must be dealt with as a
software threat as covered in the next section.
2. Memory locations within the physical machine contain
various kinds cf information. The operating system of
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a computer is normally resident in some exclusive
portion of" memory and should not be accessible to the
user. A typical method for eliminating potential
attempts to alter the operating system or other
critical storage area makes use of bounds registers.
Bounds registers contain the addresses of the first
and last locations of areas in memory that belong to
individual data sets or programs. An attempt by a
user program to access information outside the
confines of the area defined by the bounds registers
will cause an immediate exception.
3. Parity checking is another hardware convention that
promotes data integrity. In simple terms, parity
checking involves the inspection of an added bit that
is tacked on to each data unit (byte r word, half-
word). The added bit signifies whether the data unit
contains an odd or even number of 1's or ' s. If the
data is altered in some way, the chances that other
adjacent data being altered is probable. As the data
units are read, each of the parity bits are checked.
If one of the parity checks do not match, a hardware
exception will occur,
u. Automatic terminal identification is another hardware
security measure. When a terminal is turned on, an
automatic signal is generated that identifies that
terminal. If the code received by the processor does
not agree with the list of authorized terminal codes,
the terminal in question is locked out. This situa-
tion can occur when a peaetrator attempts to tap into
a system using his own terminal.
The above methods of hardware security are generalized
and cover a wide range of specific implementations. Other
error detection, identification, and interrupt designs are
frequently used and are usually automatic. The computer
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system manager should be interested in what methods are
available on various machines so that intelligent judgements
can be made during procurement evolutions. Beyond that
aspect of hardware security, the manager has little control
over hardware security.
F. SOFTWARE SECURITY
Software counter measures are the most numerous type of
security device and are normally designed to limit access in
some manner. The following paragraphs describe some typical
software security methods.
1 » XkSI Security Kernel
The security kernel is essentially a series of small
subroutines that limits the access of other programs,
including the operating system. The design of the kernel is
based on a precise specification or matmatical model of its
function. The model is composed of a set of access rules
plus a set of user attributes (clearance, need to know) and
information attributes (classification) " Ref . 14: p. 28].
Figure 6.3 shews the conceptual form of a security kernel.
Note that it employs a front -end processor and that it is
the base layer in the typical software hierarchy. The
kernel programs objectively evaluate access reguests (read,
write, use) issued by a user, by another program, or by the
operating system. The overhead of the kernel is reputed to
be minimal.
2« Eisswcrd Syst ems
Password systems are nil lt.i- layer software overlays
(see Figure 6.4) that approve and deny access based on a
user response to a password request from the system. User
























Figure 6.3 Conceptual View of a Security Kernel.
correct response is made to a password request, access is
granted; otherwise access is denied and terminal lockout may
occur. Each user can either have multiple passwords that
access different layers of information (programs, data,
service requests), or have a single password that accesses
56

all layers. Which ever method is used, the password file
















Figure 6.4 Layered Password System.
systems are probably the most widely used of the software
countermeasures, but, due to carelessness in the handling





File matrices operate much like password systems.
Each file is prefixed with a table that lists those programs
and users that are authorized access. Instead of listing
each user or using program, some matrices use classifica-
tions of users. Another variation may be constructed in
either of the above ways and will contain additional infor-
mation as to the level of use. The levels of use include
categories such as "read", "write", or "use". "read" allows
the user to read the file, "write" allows a user to write to
a file, that is, modify it, and "use" allows neither "read"
or "write" capability, but allows the use of the file. The
matrices can be very simpl= or very complicated and
depending on the the degree of complication, incurs a
commensurate run-time overhead.
*• Program Auditors
Program auditors are programs designed to check
other programs for integrity. A typical auditor will deter-
mine the number of lines of code in a particular program and
compare its finding with a table containing the number of
lines the program is supposed to have. This countermeasure
is designed to prevent the insertion of trapdoors and trojan
horses or the deletion of critical portions of a program. A
much more complex version of the same idaa is a program that
checks the number of operators and the number of operands as
well as the value of the constants in a program.
These are but a few of the software countermeasures
employed by various installations. The security kernel is
largely experimental at this writing (although the concept
was originally identified around 1972) and the other methods
have their individual failings and drawbacks such as exces-
sive run-time overhead, the requirement for additional
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hardware, and the usage of an inordinate amount of storage
space.
G. OTHER COUNTEBHEASOBES
The preceding sections have delineated several specific
countermeasure methods that are designed to avert specific
threats and threat classifications. Two very important coun-
termeasures remain that are major parts of a risk management
program.
The first of the two methods is auditing. Auditing
entails the establishment of a comprehensive mechanism for
confirming the reliability and the "correctness" of the
system. The most important part of the auditing system is
the construction of an audit trail. Audit trails are based
upon single transactions and involve the establishment of
corroborating evidence of who entered the system, what
resources were used, and what the result was. It is beyound
the scope of this thesis to attanpt a full explairation of a
audit trail model, however, the reader is encouraged to
consult the writings of B jork ^Ref. 11: pp. 229-245] for a
comprehensive disertation on the subject.
The second important risk management method concerns
contingency planning. Contingency planning is the method by
which recovery from the failure of countermeasures is accom-
plished. As such, it addresses every category of loss and
every threat that a specific installation is vulnerable to.
A typical contingency plan covers the topics listed in Table





Contingency Plan Tasks and Responsibilities
1. Identification of contingency conditions
2. Evacuation procedures
3. Powering down procedures
a. Flood and foul weather plan
5. Fire plan
6. First aid plan
7. Classified information securing/destruction planning
8. Back-up planning
9. Back-up support planning
Recovery planning10.
1 1. Temporary site reguirements and selection
12. Hardware/software procurement planning
13. Emeraency fund procurement
14. Contingency training
15. Mass medical emergency
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II. A COMPUTER SECURITY SURVEY
A. EACK GROUND
Chapters 1 through 6 have dealt with the scope of the
security problem facing the computer systems manager, the
legislation and directives concerning the topic, some risk
management technigues , and the threats to computer security
and the countermeasures freguently used to combat those
threats. The purpose of the preceding chapters has been to
give the apprentice computer systems manager a conversa-
tional knowledge of the topic and to emphasize the
procedures, laws, and methods used by the manager in the
performance of his duties. The managers of today's military
computer installations must not only be proficient in their
assigned tasks as managers, they must also be proficient as
soldiers, sailors, -airmen and Marines. As such the military
computer systems manager must contend with physical fitness
training for himself and his nen, military training, drug
and alcohol abuse programs, human rights seminars, gun
polishing, boot shining, etc. It is therefore fair for a
fledgling manager to inguire a s to how one does it ail.
Further, in the context of this thesis, how is computer
security treated in the typical military computer center and
what priority is it accorded?
In an attempt to answer those guestions, and to gain
some first hand knowledge of the techniques employed by the
military to combat computer fraud and misuse, a survey of a
typical military data processing center was conducted. The
survey approech was that of a learning evolution with the
chief benefit going to the author. Since the remainder of
this chapter takes en the characteristics of a critical
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review, the name of the computer installation surveyed will
not be mentioned to preclude repercussions that might occur
due to the content of the survey.
B. INSTALLATION DESCRIPTION
Computer installations are, for tha most part, task
organized. As such, the type and size of equipment, number
of operators, communications media, and environment may vary
widely. Since different installations require different
security, a description of tha surveyed computer center is
presented to put the security critique that follows in
perspective.
The Computer Data Processing Activity (CDPA) surveyed
had recently completed a relocation to a new multi-purpose
building that had been designed specifically for the unique
environment that a computer canter requires. The transfer
of the organization's hardware was accomplished without
maior difficulty. The hardware presently operated by the
CDPA consists of a 16 megabyte core memory, a CPU similar to
an IBM 370, 46 disk units, 42 tape drives, and an external
communications device. The operating system is similar to
the IBM MVS/VM systeir and supports both a variety of local
and remote job entry access devices. Figure 7,1 shows the
organization of the local area network. The CDPA is one of
seven major nodes on a world wide network with communication
between nodes provided largely by commercial telephone and
microwave media. Figure 7.2 shows the organization of the
world wide network. As the figure shows, the network is
organized so as to provide communication links between major
nodes. Communication is accomplished, in most cases, via
perferred routing but alternate routing is available in the
event of degradation cr failure of major node communication
capability. The external communications device functions
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data transmission to occur during computer system down time.
The local area network is supported by the same -external
communications equipment but there is no redundant routing
feature employed.
The CDPA is manned by a military to civilian (GS)
personnel ratio of 3 to 1. The director and his assistant
are military and the several major departments are headed by
an approximately equal number of military and civilian
personnel. The CDPA, as well as the seven ether major nodes
support a variety of integratad databases and applications
including personnel management, logistics, and operations
support. The CDPA itself supports no classified processing
but does process sensitive to moderately sensitive informa-
tion. The security officer's position is assigned to the
communications officer as a collateral duty.
The CDPA is currently experiencing a capacity problem as
Figure 7.3 illustrates. The capacity problem is caused by
inadequate CPU speed/capacity during peak interactive
terminal demand and is causing a serious rpspor.se time
problem during those periods. Figure 7.4 shows the histor-
ical and projected growth of the numbar of interactive
terminals in the world wide network. Assuming that the CDPA
will support a fair share of the the anticipated growth, it
is obvious that the capacity problem now beina experienced
will certainly be aggravated.
Another problem being experienced by the CDPA specifi-
cally and this particular military service in general, is
the number of data processing billets available. Figure 7.4
implies that the personnel workload for the total system
will soon increase rapidly. Figure 7.5 , however projects a
rather stable number of data processing billets. It is
expected that future hardware procurements will partially
respond to this problem by way of technological advances. It
is felt, however, that these advances will not accommodate
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the increased workload totally. The relevancy of this obser-
vation and that of the capacity problem to computer security
will be established later in this chapter.
The attitude of top management toward the the security
of their system is an important ingedient in the level of
system security in any system. The weaknesses of this CDPA's
security system, as identified in this thesis, came as no
surprise to the installation's chief executives. Because of
the absence of classified processing, the chief concern
expressed in many of the interviews was for data integrity
and protection. System conf iientiality, it was observed,
commanded very little attention.
C. CONDUCT OF THE SURVEY
The survey was conducted according to a consolidated
checklist composed of inputs from two very comprehensive
checklists [ Ref- 7] and [ Ref . 8]. Each checklist item was
either personally observed by the suveyor or addressed in
one of several interviews. For the puposes of this thesis,
each major checklist category was reducei to comments about
particular problems or highlights and/or a category posture












1- Risk Managem ent
As discussed in an earlier chapter, risk management
is the dynamic process by which the total of all system
threats is assessed and through which the trade offs
between security safeguards and the expenditure of resources
are determined. The CDPA, it appears, has only a general
skeleton of a risk management program in place. There are no
local risk management publications and no one person is
directly responsible for the preparation of a risk manage-
ment program. Risk management, at best, is in an infancy
stage within the CDPA. In the author's opinion, a valuable
opportunity for the initiation of a risk management program
was foregone during the conception and planning stages of
the the CDPA's recent relocation. An obvious flaw in the
design of the new building, in teems of computer security,
was discovered during the survey and addressed under phys-
ical security later in this chapter. If the building had
been designed with security in mind from the outset, (for
instance, with a risk management team as part of the design
committee), the physical security would have been enhanced.
Although no formal risk management system exists at
the CDPA, it was obvious to the observer that the level of
security awareness was extremely high. In small systems, a
very high level of security awareness nay be substituted
successfully for a risk management prcgraa. In an organiza-
tion the size of the CDPA, a risk management program is
highly lesireable. The complexity of the 3DPA system is such
that a highly organized and systematic approach to the





With the exception of some obvious, easily correc-
table discrepancies, the physical security of the CDPA
appears to be superior. The building in which the CDPA
resides serves both the CDPA ani a closely related activity.
Both organizations maintain independent operations and very
little infrigement on each other's spaces is required. The
building itself is constructed of fire retardent materials.
It is located on a military reservation with regular and
frequent military police patrols. Response time of both the
military police and the fire department has been been tested
at less than two minutes. The building's fire alarm, detec-
tion, and extinguisher systems, the electrical power system,
and the environmental system are ail redandantly installed.
Storage areas and user access points are physically sepa-
rated from the main computer room.
There are two chinks in the physical security
system. Two very large windows are located in the computer
room. Although the windows are reputed to be very strong and
highly resistant to breakage, their presence causes exces-
sive solar heating during the warmer months of the year. The
windows are located directly over a large bank of disk
drives at one end of the room and over the communications
device at the other. The increased heat has not caused an
undue number cf disk drive failures or communications prob-
lems to date, but the service life of both devices may be
adversely affected if positive measures are not taken.
There is currently a work order on file at the local facili-
ties maintenance organization requesting that the windows be
removed and replaced with concrete and brick. The request




The second physical security problem is the absence
of a suitable archival storage area. At present, archival
file storage is located in the basement of the building in a
cinderblock vault. The vault has its own environmental
control and fire extinguishing systems, but it is located
next to a supply storeroom filled with materials such as
continuous form paper and duplicating fluid. In the author's
estimation, this arrangement is not adequate for archival
storage and is inconsistant with the CDPA's concern for data
integrity. A possible remedy for this inadeguacy might be
the use of an underground vault located outside the perim-
eter of the building. Not only does this arrangement
minimize the threat of fire from the adjacent storeroom, it
protects the archival files from building collapse in case
of fire or natural disaster.
3. Communications Security (COM SEC)
The CDPA does not employ any extraordinary COMSEC
techniques or devices. Data communication between the CDPA,
its remote job entry sites, and other nodes in the world
wide network is accomplished ovs r commercial telephone lines
and microwave relay. Packet switching and encryption tech-
niques are not used because of the absence of classified
data files resident on the CDPA's storage media. Further,
the users of the information, superior levels in the command
chain, do not support encryption because they percieve no
need or utility from the technique.
There is at least one reason to support the employ-
ment of COMSEC measures. Although no single piece of
information is, in itself, classified, a particular proces-
sing application could combine information in such a way
that the aggraga^ed information could, in fact be useful to
a potential penetrarcr. There is little doubt that the
computer professionals of the CDPA have recognized this
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possible iocphole but their hands are politically tied.
Their task is not procedural at this point, it is political.
The resistance of seniors in ths command chain to the incor-
poration of COMSEC must be overcome bsfore someone else
locates this weakness in the system.
4. Emanations Security
The CDPA has no emanations security procedures or
devices in place. The multiprogramming feature of the opera-
ting system is, in the opinion of the installation
commander, a sufficient confidentiality safeguard against
the intentional procurement of sensitive information through
emanations interception. Nots also that the cost of
shielding a facility the size of the CDPA against emanations
threats would most likely be prohibitive.
5- Hardware Security
The equipment operated by the CDPA is modern and
incorporates many of the hardware features conducive to data
protection into the system. The following is a listing of
the hardware security attributes present in the CDPA
equipment.
Privileged and non-privileged instruction set
Register error detection and redundancy checks





Controlled supervisory mois access
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6. So ftware Security
At the beginning of this chapter, it was noted that
the CDPA was experiencing a CPU capacity problem. Boehm
[Ref. 12: p. 13] points out that the cost of software begins
to increase increase steeply at approximately the 85% satu-
ration of CPU or memory capacity of a given system.
Although he does not explain the sources of his observation,
the general explaination for the sudden jump in software
cost is a drop in programmer productivity caused by an
emphasis being placed on software efficiency. Wulf [Ref- 13:
p. 95], observes that
more computing sins are committed in the name of effi-
ciency {without necessarily ashieveing it) than for any
other single reason...
Efficient code, albeit desireable, has the innate quality of
being difficult to read and understand. This certainly
complicates the task of the maintenance programmer. Add
this complication to the fact that the CDPA anticipates
programmer workload to increase and the stage is set for the
emphasis to be removed from proven software design nethods.
The end result of an emphsis Dn efficient running code is
that security takes a backseat and the unstructured code
becomes a effective hiding place for subversion techniques.
It is unlikely that the CDPA will have much success with
security software until their capacity problems are solved.
It must be acknowledged, at this point, that the 3DPA has
plans to acquire additional CPU capacity. In addition, a
software overlay - essentially a password system - is being
tested for use on the major noies on the world wide network.
At the time of this writing, however, the only data protec-
tion software in place was a data base language system using
an integral data dictionary.
in

7 » Personnel Security
Personnel security at the CDPA appears to be
adequate. The screening of personnel for duty in the data
processing field in this branch of the military is complete
and very selective. Most of the personnel at the CDPA have
"SECRET" security clearances and each person is required to
attend intensive security training prior to assuming duties.
Regularly scheduled refresher training is accomplished in
accordance with the local security plan. Due to the diffi-
culty encountered in the re tension of highly trained
personnel, there is no mechanism for rotating personnel
through various billets. This problem is service wide and
not directly attributable to CDPA management techniques.
8. Disaster Cont inqency Planning
Prior to the relocation of the CDPA, a comprehensive
contingency plan was developed by the CDPA director and his
staff. At the time of developaent , the CDPA was located in
an older building considerably more vulnerable to physical
threats and natural disaster. The plan included purchasing
contingent capacity from a computer services vender. The
plan was rejected by upper level management because it was
too expensive. There exists some mutual backup capability
between -he major nodes in the world wide network and the
feeling is that priority processing could be beain within 48
hours of a disaster using ether nodes* capability, bat there
is no published contingency plan and the recovery plan is,
of course, dependent on the availability of archival files.
The fine points of -his informal recovery plan are obscure
both to the observer and, it is suspected, to CDPA
personnel. The topic of backup is mentioned at every meeting





The intended purpose of this thesis is to present the
reader with an overview of computer security and to
encourage further study of the subject by those who cate-
gorize themseleves as computer systems managers. The major
underlying objectives of this work are to convey the broad
scope of the topic, cite the importance of risk management,
and to present what the author believes to be the overall
status accorded computer secuity in the contemporary ADP
environment. This last objective is the subject of the
following paragraphs.
While it is difficult to generalize about a population
using a sample size of one, the implications of the survey
summarized in Chapter 7 have been informally corroborated by
conversations with active and past computer professionals.
The most pointed commentary is a article by Air Force
Colonel Roger Schell, [Ref. 14: p. 16-33 ], past instructor
at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and
curr€ntly the Deputy Director of DOD Computer Security
Evaluation at Ft. Meade, Maryland. In the article, Colonel
Schell warns of the dangers that result, from a lack of an
aggressive security posture and is critioal of the present
state of military computer security. In view of this obser-
vation by the foremost computer security expert in the
Department of Defense, the following observations are made.
First and foremost an information system should perform
its intended task as well as its conceptual planning allows.
A secondary, but important portion of the information
system's task is to ensure that the quality of the informa-
tion it contains is preseved and that the disemination of
that information is made selectively. Saying that another
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way - the informaticn system should ensure availability,
integrity, and confidentiality of the information it stores
and operates upon. If an information system does not provide
these assurances in seme greater degree, it is probable that
one of the following conditions are present:
• management ignorance
• lack of resources
• lack of security maintenance
The first condition is not widespread at the installa-
tion level. It is more a failing of management levels above
where managers are not likely to ba computer-oriented
personnel and, as such, have very little, if any, feel for
the vulnerability of computers. Unfortunately, those same
upper-level managers also control the financial and
personnel assets reguired to implement security assurance.
The second condition is a problem faced by both ailitary
and civilian managers and is sel f-explainatory
.
The third condition, as Scheil points out, is the
continuing reliance on established security measures without
periodic review. He cites historical references of misplaced
trust in security measures ( the breaking of the German and
Japanese communication codes during World War II) and urges
managerial personnel to continually evaluate security
mea sures
.
The priority accorded computer security in today's ADP
community appears to te low. Since the tools and the tech-
nology for effective security are available, one must deduce
then, that complacency is the chief cause for this undesire-
able status. It is therefore incumbent upon the computer
systems manager to promote risk analysis and to educate at
all levels of management on the effects of a poor security
program. Until progress is made in reducing the complacency
level, the very fabric of the decision making process -
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